Self-optimisation of admission control and handover parameters in LTE

In mobile cellular networks the handover (HO) algorithm is responsible for determining when calls of users that are moving from one cell to another are handed over from the former to the latter. The admission control (AC) algorithm, which is the algorithm that decides whether new (fresh or HO) calls that enter a cell are allowed to the cell or not, often tries to facilitate HO by prioritising HO calls in favour of fresh calls. In this way, a good quality of service (QoS) for calls that are already admitted to the network is pursued. In this paper, the effect of self-optimisation of AC parameters on the HO performance in a long term evolution (LTE) network is studied, both with and without the self-optimisation of HO parameters. Simulation results show that the AC parameter optimisation algorithm considerably improves the HO performance by reducing the amount of calls that are dropped prior to or during HO

Neurofilament light levels predict clinical progression and death in multiple system atrophy

Disease-modifying treatments are currently being trialed in multiple system atrophy (MSA). Approaches based solely on clinical measures are challenged by heterogeneity of phenotype and pathogenic complexity. Neurofilament light chain protein has been explored as a reliable biomarker in several neurodegenerative disorders but data in multiple system atrophy have been limited. Therefore, neurofilament light chain is not yet routinely used as an outcome measure in MSA. We aimed to comprehensively investigate the role and dynamics of neurofilament light chain in multiple system atrophy combined with cross-sectional and longitudinal clinical and imaging scales and for subject trial selection. In this cohort study we recruited cross-sectional and longitudinal cases in multicentre European set-up. Plasma and cerebrospinal fluid neurofilament light chain concentrations were measured at baseline from 212 multiple system atrophy cases, annually for a mean period of 2 years in 44 multiple system atrophy patients in conjunction with clinical, neuropsychological and MRI brain assessments. Baseline neurofilament light chain characteristics were compared between groups. Cox regression was used to assess survival; ROC analysis to assess the ability of neurofilament light chain to distinguish between multiple system atrophy patients and healthy controls. Multivariate linear mixed effects models were used to analyse longitudinal neurofilament light chain changes and correlated with clinical and imaging parameters. Polynomial models were used to determine the differential trajectories of neurofilament light chain in multiple system atrophy. We estimated sample sizes for trials aiming to decrease NfL levels. We show that in multiple system atrophy, baseline plasma neurofilament light chain levels were better predictors of clinical progression, survival, and degree of brain atrophy than the NfL rate of change. Comparative analysis of multiple system atrophy progression over the course of disease, using plasma neurofilament light chain and clinical rating scales, indicated that neurofilament light chain levels rise as the motor symptoms progress, followed by deceleration in advanced stages. Sample size prediction suggested that significantly lower trial participant numbers would be needed to demonstrate treatment effects when incorporating plasma neurofilament light chain values into multiple system atrophy clinical trials in comparison to clinical measures alone. In conclusion, neurofilament light chain correlates with clinical disease severity, progression, and prognosis in multiple system atrophy. Combined with clinical and imaging analysis, neurofilament light chain can inform patient stratification and serve as a reliable biomarker of treatment response in future multiple system atrophy trials of putative disease-modifying agents.European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programm

HS-DSCH i olicensierade frekvensband

In the standardized air interface for third generation mobile communication systems, WCDMA release 5, a concept called High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) is introduced. HSDPA enables faster transmissions from base stations to mobile users by using a shared, high-capacity channel called the High-Speed Downlink Shared Channel (HS-DSCH) that is designed for best effort services. The HS-DSCH is developed for usage in the frequency band licensed for third generation communication systems. As the use of licensed frequency bands is costly it may be interesting to make use of the unlicensed frequency bands at 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz with higher interference and stricter regulations. Using HS- DSCH in unlicensed frequency bands would lead to smaller costs and a new kind of usage of the HS-DSCH. In order to transmit in unlicensed frequency bands, some requirements set up by the public authorities must be followed. This means that the maximum transmit power used by the HS-DSCH must be decreased and, on the 5 GHz frequency band, that features to avoid disturbing radar systems have to be implemented. The HS- DSCH has a bandwidth of 5 MHz. To use the available frequency spectra more efficiently, multiple carriers could be used. Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) are the most common way to transfer data in unlicensed frequency bands today. Assessments and simulations of WLAN and the HS-DSCH in unlicensed frequency bands show that WLAN can provide higher bitrates than the HS-DSCH for low loads. HS-DSCH can however provide a larger coverage per base station, and is more bandwidth effective than WLAN. Using a larger bandwidth is necessary for HS-DSCH to compete with WLAN, which uses a bandwidth approximately four times as large as the HS-DSCH bandwidth. The usage of the HS-DSCH in unlicensed frequency bands also has the advantage that the services provided by the third generation communication systems can be accessed easily

Sectoral agreements and competitive distortions - a Swedish perspective

The objectives of this study are to: 1. Give an overview of the current discussion concerning competition distortion in relation to climate policy, 2. Describe results from some studies estimating the actual competition situation for selected activities, 3. Describe what sector agreement models are suggested/ discussed by EU, 4. Describe what sectors are most interesting to target with a sector agreement from a Swedish point of view, 5. Analyse what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish Industry. Two studies, for the United Kingdom (Hourcade et al 2008) and Germany (Graichen et al 2008), have recently assessed the potential cost impact for different industrial sectors of CO2-prices due to the EU ETS. Maximum value at stake was used as metrics. The sectors with high potential impact, with a maximum value at stake larger than 10%, are in the United Kingdom Lime and cement, Basic iron and steel, Starches, Refined petroleum, Fertilizers and Nitrogen compounds and Aluminium. In Germany, the sectors with a maximum value at stake larger than 10% are: Cement and lime, Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, Basic iron and steel, Aluminium, Paper and board, Other basic inorganic compounds and Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuels. Ex-ante studies of the impacts of competitiveness and carbon leakage due to the EU ETS fail to find actual impacts. However, that does not mean that there will be no impact in the future, which hold changes both in the EU ETS (method for allowance allocation, allowance prices etc) and possibly also other important circumstances (global demand for certain products and global product prices). In this study, based on official Swedish statistics, the maximum value a stake has been calculated for 52 Swedish sectors. Seven sectors have a maximum value a stake of more than 4%: Coke and refined petroleum (21%), Pulp and paper (11%), Basic metals (10%), Non-metallic mineral (9%), Metal ore mines (6%), Air transport (5%) and Electricity, gas and heat (4%). If Air transport and Electricity, gas and heat are omitted, the five remaining sectors account for 22% of Sweden's carbon emissions. In the Swedish Non-metallic mineral sector (including Cement and lime) the maximum value at stake is considerably lower than for Cement and lime in the UK and Germany. This is most likely due differences in system boundaries. In the Swedish statistics, the Cement and lime industry is a minor part (in terms of value added) of the Non-metallic mineral sector, a sector that also includes Stone, sand and soil industry. The calculated maximum value at stake for Non-metallic mineral is therefore a poor proxy for the Cement and lime sector since other sub sectors may 'dilute' the maximum value at stake. Differences in system boundaries may also explain the significant difference in maximum value at stake between the Swedish steel industry and UK and German steel industries. Other possible explanations may be a higher value added per unit, differences in how value added is calculated, different years applied for the analysis and lower CO2-intensity for Swedish products. In late 2008, the EU proposed three types of sector approaches to be discussed under the Ad-hoc Working Group on future commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP): i) Sector CDM - a CDM crediting mechanism with a previously established baseline ii) Sectoral no-lose mechanism - Sectoral crediting against a previously established no-lose target iii) Sectoral emission trading based on a sector emissions cap Based on these three sectoral models, we have analysed what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish industry. We have assumed that these sector agreements are implemented in a developing country (DC). We conclude that if sector agreements are to reduce distortions on competition, it is important that the sector agreements create a real carbon price in the DC, i.e. that emissions of carbon dioxide are associated with a cost for the emitter. All three sector agreement-models suggested by the EU can potentially create a carbon price. The driver for emission reductions are in all three cases the international demand for offsets. As a potentially large buyer of off-sets, the EU demand for off-sets is likely to increase the carbon price in the DC sector. The choice of EU policy with respect to imports of off-set will therefore have great importance. Other buyers, such as other countries, emission trading systems or the voluntary credit market will of course also be important. Moreover, imports of off-sets may reduce the price on EU ETS allowances, thus further narrowing the carbon price gap between the two markets. If an important objective of a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it should be implemented in sectors where the corresponding Swedish industry has significant carbon related costs and where there is significant trade intensity between Sweden and regions outside the EU. Our preliminary analysis indicates that Swedish sectors with potentially high maximum value at stake (direct carbon and indirect electricity cost) are Refineries; Pulp and Paper; Iron and Steel;Cement and Lime; and Metal ore mining. The sectors Aluminium and Fertilizers may be important, but have not been assessed explicitly in this study. In addition, electricity production can be important to include in a sectoral agreement since the electricity price may be a significant cost for certain sectors exposed to international competition. Pass-through of costs - consumer incentives. If a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it is important that the sector participating in the sectoral agreement can pass through the additional carbon costs on the commodity so the carbon intensive products become more expensive for the consumer. A full pass through of the carbon cost could be compromised in countries with centrally regulated prices on carbon intensive commodities or other measures that shield the true price of carbon from the consumer. Target setting - producer incentives. The rules for setting the targets in the DC sector are crucial from a producer incentive point of view. There are two main options here: 1) absolute targets and 2) intensity targets. Absolute targets create high incentives for carbon reductions as long as the targets are not re-negotiated. The disadvantage is that they might be difficult to negotiate due to difficulties in finding an appropriate emission level, risk for hot air and the inflexibility to future adjustments. Intensity targets are based on output times an intensity factor (called benchmarking). But benchmarking leads to reduced incentives: i) as a production subsidy it encourages overproduction and ii) dis-incentivises the substitution to carbon efficient products. A third, theoretical, option would be absolute targets that are updated according to historic emissions. This model would, however, seriously undermine the incentives for emission reductions. In this study, we have argued that from a competition point of view, it's important to create a carbon price in the developing country. A different issue relates to how different sector agreement models influence the compliance costs of participating firms. We describe a situation where a DC industry sector is linked to the EU ETS, and where the EU industry pays for allowances (no free allocation). For a Sector emission trading system where the DC industry has to pay for allowances, the compliance costs could be compatible in the two regions. For Sector CDM and Sector no-lose mechanism, if the government implements a domestic carbon tax, the compliance costs may also be compatible in the two regions. However, if allowances are allocated freely to the DC industry and no tax is implemented, the DC industry would have no costs associated with the carbon emissions below the compliance level. There could here be a significant difference in compliance costs between the industries in the two regions. We have, however, not analysed if significant asymmetries in compliance costs can lead to competitive distortions between regions.The objectives of this study are to: 1. Give an overview of the current discussion concerning competition distortion in relation to climate policy, 2. Describe results from some studies estimating the actual competition situation for selected activities, 3. Describe what sector agreement models are suggested/ discussed by EU, 4. Describe what sectors are most interesting to target with a sector agreement from a Swedish point of view, 5. Analyse what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish Industry. Two studies, for the United Kingdom (Hourcade et al 2008) and Germany (Graichen et al 2008), have recently assessed the potential cost impact for different industrial sectors of CO2-prices due to the EU ETS. Maximum value at stake was used as metrics. The sectors with high potential impact, with a maximum value at stake larger than 10%, are in the United Kingdom Lime and cement, Basic iron and steel, Starches, Refined petroleum, Fertilizers and Nitrogen compounds and Aluminium. In Germany, the sectors with a maximum value at stake larger than 10% are: Cement and lime, Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds, Basic iron and steel, Aluminium, Paper and board, Other basic inorganic compounds and Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuels. Ex-ante studies of the impacts of competitiveness and carbon leakage due to the EU ETS fail to find actual impacts. However, that does not mean that there will be no impact in the future, which hold changes both in the EU ETS (method for allowance allocation, allowance prices etc) and possibly also other important circumstances (global demand for certain products and global product prices). In this study, based on official Swedish statistics, the maximum value a stake has been calculated for 52 Swedish sectors. Seven sectors have a maximum value a stake of more than 4%: Coke and refined petroleum (21%), Pulp and paper (11%), Basic metals (10%), Non-metallic mineral (9%), Metal ore mines (6%), Air transport (5%) and Electricity, gas and heat (4%). If Air transport and Electricity, gas and heat are omitted, the five remaining sectors account for 22% of Sweden's carbon emissions. In the Swedish Non-metallic mineral sector (including Cement and lime) the maximum value at stake is considerably lower than for Cement and lime in the UK and Germany. This is most likely due differences in system boundaries. In the Swedish statistics, the Cement and lime industry is a minor part (in terms of value added) of the Non-metallic mineral sector, a sector that also includes Stone, sand and soil industry. The calculated maximum value at stake for Non-metallic mineral is therefore a poor proxy for the Cement and lime sector since other sub sectors may 'dilute' the maximum value at stake. Differences in system boundaries may also explain the significant difference in maximum value at stake between the Swedish steel industry and UK and German steel industries. Other possible explanations may be a higher value added per unit, differences in how value added is calculated, different years applied for the analysis and lower CO2-intensity for Swedish products. In late 2008, the EU proposed three types of sector approaches to be discussed under the Ad-hoc Working Group on future commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP): i) Sector CDM - a CDM crediting mechanism with a previously established baseline ii) Sectoral no-lose mechanism - Sectoral crediting against a previously established no-lose target iii) Sectoral emission trading based on a sector emissions cap Based on these three sectoral models, we have analysed what parameters are important for reducing competition distortion for Swedish industry. We have assumed that these sector agreements are implemented in a developing country (DC). We conclude that if sector agreements are to reduce distortions on competition, it is important that the sector agreements create a real carbon price in the DC, i.e. that emissions of carbon dioxide are associated with a cost for the emitter. All three sector agreement-models suggested by the EU can potentially create a carbon price. The driver for emission reductions are in all three cases the international demand for offsets. As a potentially large buyer of off-sets, the EU demand for off-sets is likely to increase the carbon price in the DC sector. The choice of EU policy with respect to imports of off-set will therefore have great importance. Other buyers, such as other countries, emission trading systems or the voluntary credit market will of course also be important. Moreover, imports of off-sets may reduce the price on EU ETS allowances, thus further narrowing the carbon price gap between the two markets. If an important objective of a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it should be implemented in sectors where the corresponding Swedish industry has significant carbon related costs and where there is significant trade intensity between Sweden and regions outside the EU. Our preliminary analysis indicates that Swedish sectors with potentially high maximum value at stake (direct carbon and indirect electricity cost) are Refineries; Pulp and Paper; Iron and Steel;Cement and Lime; and Metal ore mining. The sectors Aluminium and Fertilizers may be important, but have not been assessed explicitly in this study. In addition, electricity production can be important to include in a sectoral agreement since the electricity price may be a significant cost for certain sectors exposed to international competition. Pass-through of costs - consumer incentives. If a sectoral agreement is to reduce competition distortion it is important that the sector participating in the sectoral agreement can pass through the additional carbon costs on the commodity so the carbon intensive products become more expensive for the consumer. A full pass through of the carbon cost could be compromised in countries with centrally regulated prices on carbon intensive commodities or other measures that shield the true price of carbon from the consumer. Target setting - producer incentives. The rules for setting the targets in the DC sector are crucial from a producer incentive point of view. There are two main options here: 1) absolute targets and 2) intensity targets. Absolute targets create high incentives for carbon reductions as long as the targets are not re-negotiated. The disadvantage is that they might be difficult to negotiate due to difficulties in finding an appropriate emission level, risk for hot air and the inflexibility to future adjustments. Intensity targets are based on output times an intensity factor (called benchmarking). But benchmarking leads to reduced incentives: i) as a production subsidy it encourages overproduction and ii) dis-incentivises the substitution to carbon efficient products. A third, theoretical, option would be absolute targets that are updated according to historic emissions. This model would, however, seriously undermine the incentives for emission reductions. In this study, we have argued that from a competition point of view, it's important to create a carbon price in the developing country. A different issue relates to how different sector agreement models influence the compliance costs of participating firms. We describe a situation where a DC industry sector is linked to the EU ETS, and where the EU industry pays for allowances (no free allocation). For a Sector emission trading system where the DC industry has to pay for allowances, the compliance costs could be compatible in the two regions. For Sector CDM and Sector no-lose mechanism, if the government implements a domestic carbon tax, the compliance costs may also be compatible in the two regions. However, if allowances are allocated freely to the DC industry and no tax is implemented, the DC industry would have no costs associated with the carbon emissions below the compliance level. There could here be a significant difference in compliance costs between the industries in the two regions. We have, however, not analysed if significant asymmetries in compliance costs can lead to competitive distortions between regions

Allowance Allocation and CO2 intensity of the EU15 and Norwegian refineries

On 1 January 2005 the European Union Emission Trading Scheme was launched. The launch was preceded by an allocation process in each of the Member States. The main objective of this study was to analyse the allocation in relation to CO2 efficiency for the mineral oil refining sector. A CO2 intensity index for mineral oil refineries was defined and calculated for the refineries within the EU15 and Norway. The IVL CO2 intensity index is based both on the Solomon Energy Intensity Index (EII), an assumed fuel mix and process-specific emissions. Due to uncertainties in input data, the determined values for the individual refineries are fairly uncertain, but the regional values can be used to identify trends. It was concluded that there are substantial differences in the CO2 intensity between refineries within different regions/countries in the EU and these differences have not been considered in the allocation process. However, there seems to be a correlation between allocation and CO2 efficiency for refineries in different regions. With some exceptions countries where the mineral oil refining industry has a low CO2 intensity index have allocated relatively more than countries with industries of high CO2 intensities. Only a few countries have mentioned energy efficiency or reduction potential due to CO2 intensity of fuels used. Only one country (Denmark) has explicitly given a benchmark that will be used for allocation to new mineral oil refineries.On 1 January 2005 the European Union Emission Trading Scheme was launched. The launch was preceded by an allocation process in each of the Member States. The main objective of this study was to analyse the allocation in relation to CO2 efficiency for the mineral oil refining sector. A CO2 intensity index for mineral oil refineries was defined and calculated for the refineries within the EU15 and Norway. The IVL CO2 intensity index is based both on the Solomon Energy Intensity Index (EII), an assumed fuel mix and process-specific emissions. Due to uncertainties in input data, the determined values for the individual refineries are fairly uncertain, but the regional values can be used to identify trends. It was concluded that there are substantial differences in the CO2 intensity between refineries within different regions/countries in the EU and these differences have not been considered in the allocation process. However, there seems to be a correlation between allocation and CO2 efficiency for refineries in different regions. With some exceptions countries where the mineral oil refining industry has a low CO2 intensity index have allocated relatively more than countries with industries of high CO2 intensities. Only a few countries have mentioned energy efficiency or reduction potential due to CO2 intensity of fuels used. Only one country (Denmark) has explicitly given a benchmark that will be used for allocation to new mineral oil refineries

Analysis of national allocation plans for the EU ETS

The EU ETS is a Community-wide scheme established by Directive 2003/87/EC for trading allowances to cover the emissions of greenhouse gases from permitted installations. The first phase of the EU ETS runs from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007. Each Member State must develop a National Allocation Plan for the first phase stating: · the total quantity of allowances that the Member State intends to issue during that phase; and  how it proposes to distribute those allowances among the installations which are subject to the scheme In this paper twelve of the national allocation plans have been analysed and compared to the criteria stated in the EU Directive. The twelve allocation plans analysed are: the Austrian, the Danish, the Finnish, the German, the Irish, the Lithuanian, the Luxembourg, the Dutch, the Swedish, the British and the draft Flemish (Belgium) and Portuguese. Generally most countries have allocated generously to the trading sector. The allocation has often been based on future needs. For most sectors the allocation is higher than current emissions. Many countries will have to make large reductions in the non-trading sector and/or buy credits through JI- and CDM- projects in order to fulfil their commitment according to the EU burden sharing agreement of the Kyoto Protocol. In many of the allocation plans the emission reducing measures in the non-trading sector is poorly described and the credibility of the measures are hard to determine. Two sectors have been analysed in more detail, the energy and the mineral oil refining sectors. Figures presenting allocation vs. current emissions for those sectors are given for those countries where data was available in the allocation plan. The energy sector has been considered to have the best possibilities to pass on costs for the allowances to the consumers and hence the allocation to this sector is often more restricted than the allocation to other sectors. The mineral oil refining sector is more exposed to competition from installations outside the system and hence more sensitive to extra costs. This sector is also affected by other Community legislation that will lead to higher emissions. Some allocation plans have clear infringements to the rules given in the Directive 2003/87/EC. Many countries have suggested ex post adjustment of allocation due to different circumstances, which might violate Article 11.1 to the Directive. This paper also contains a list on the status of the allocation plans as of 18 August 2004 and the comments to the allocation plans given in the Commission decisions taken upon them. As of today, 18 August 2004 not all Member States have submitted their final national allocation plan to the Commissions and not all of the plans submitted have been assessed by the CommissionThe EU ETS is a Community-wide scheme established by Directive 2003/87/EC for trading allowances to cover the emissions of greenhouse gases from permitted installations. The first phase of the EU ETS runs from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007. Each Member State must develop a National Allocation Plan for the first phase stating: · the total quantity of allowances that the Member State intends to issue during that phase; and  how it proposes to distribute those allowances among the installations which are subject to the scheme In this paper twelve of the national allocation plans have been analysed and compared to the criteria stated in the EU Directive. The twelve allocation plans analysed are: the Austrian, the Danish, the Finnish, the German, the Irish, the Lithuanian, the Luxembourg, the Dutch, the Swedish, the British and the draft Flemish (Belgium) and Portuguese. Generally most countries have allocated generously to the trading sector. The allocation has often been based on future needs. For most sectors the allocation is higher than current emissions. Many countries will have to make large reductions in the non-trading sector and/or buy credits through JI- and CDM- projects in order to fulfil their commitment according to the EU burden sharing agreement of the Kyoto Protocol. In many of the allocation plans the emission reducing measures in the non-trading sector is poorly described and the credibility of the measures are hard to determine. Two sectors have been analysed in more detail, the energy and the mineral oil refining sectors. Figures presenting allocation vs. current emissions for those sectors are given for those countries where data was available in the allocation plan. The energy sector has been considered to have the best possibilities to pass on costs for the allowances to the consumers and hence the allocation to this sector is often more restricted than the allocation to other sectors. The mineral oil refining sector is more exposed to competition from installations outside the system and hence more sensitive to extra costs. This sector is also affected by other Community legislation that will lead to higher emissions. Some allocation plans have clear infringements to the rules given in the Directive 2003/87/EC. Many countries have suggested ex post adjustment of allocation due to different circumstances, which might violate Article 11.1 to the Directive. This paper also contains a list on the status of the allocation plans as of 18 August 2004 and the comments to the allocation plans given in the Commission decisions taken upon them. As of today, 18 August 2004 not all Member States have submitted their final national allocation plan to the Commissions and not all of the plans submitted have been assessed by the Commissio

The cognitive profile and CSF biomarkers in dementia with Lewy bodies and Parkinson's disease dementia.

Dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) and Parkinson's disease dementia (PDD) may be viewed as different points on a continuum reflecting the regional burden and distribution of pathology. An important clinical consideration is overlapping Alzheimer's disease (AD) pathology, since it has been reported that associated AD pathology in DLB shortens survival and leads to a more rapid cognitive decline. We aimed to investigate cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) biomarkers and the associated cognitive profile in DLB and PDD

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading for the Transport sector

In this study we have analysed different options to apply emissions trading for greenhouse gas emissions to the transport sector. The main focus has been on the EU transport sector and the possibility to include it in the current EU ETS in the trading period beginning in 2013. The purpose was to study how different alternatives will affect different actors. Focus has been on three sub sectors; road transport, aviation and shipping. The railway sector has only been treated on a general level. The study includes the following three parts: 1. An economic analysis of the consequences of greenhouse gas emissions trading for the transport sector including an analysis of how the total cost for reaching an emission target will be affected by an integrated emissions trading system for the transport sector and the industry (currently included sectors) compared to separate systems for the sectors, 2. An analysis of design possibilities for the different sub-sectors. Discussion of positive and negative aspects with different choices of design parameters, such as trading entity, covered greenhouse gases , allocation of emission allowances and monitoring systems, 3. Examination of the acceptance among different actors for different options of using greenhouse gas emissions trading in the transport sector .....In this study we have analysed different options to apply emissions trading for greenhouse gas emissions to the transport sector. The main focus has been on the EU transport sector and the possibility to include it in the current EU ETS in the trading period beginning in 2013. The purpose was to study how different alternatives will affect different actors. Focus has been on three sub sectors; road transport, aviation and shipping. The railway sector has only been treated on a general level. The study includes the following three parts: 1. An economic analysis of the consequences of greenhouse gas emissions trading for the transport sector including an analysis of how the total cost for reaching an emission target will be affected by an integrated emissions trading system for the transport sector and the industry (currently included sectors) compared to separate systems for the sectors, 2. An analysis of design possibilities for the different sub-sectors. Discussion of positive and negative aspects with different choices of design parameters, such as trading entity, covered greenhouse gases , allocation of emission allowances and monitoring systems, 3. Examination of the acceptance among different actors for different options of using greenhouse gas emissions trading in the transport sector ....